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Wicox, Jr.: Environmental Law - Will Jurisdiction Attach in Citizen Suits aga

CASENOTE
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-Will Jurisdiction Attach in Citizen Suits
Against Wholly Past Permit Violators Under Section 505 of the Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. section 1365? Gwaltney of Smithfield v.
Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 376 (1987).
Between 1981 and 1984, Gwaltney of Smithfield (Gwaltney) admitted exceeding its permitted limits on various pollutants it allowed to flow
into Virginia's Pagan River.1 The company's National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) permit 2 established limits under which
Gwaltney was permitted to dump materials from its pork processing and
packing facility into the Pagan.3 Gwaltney reported exceeding those limits
in its own discharge monitoring reports,4 which are required by law for
permit holders. 5
During the period in question, Gwaltney violated its limits on chlorine thirty-four times, fecal coliform thirty-one times and total Kjeldahl
nitrogen (TKN) eighty-seven times.6 However, because of an upgraded
wastewater treatment system installed in October 1983, Gwaltney's last
reported violation occurred on May 15, 1984. 7
Chesapeake Bay Foundation and Natural Resources Defense Council
(Foundation) sent notice in February 1984, to Gwaltney, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Virginia
State Water Control Board, indicating their intent to sue' under section
505 of the Clean Water Act, the citizen suit provision. 9 The Foundation
1. Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 376, 379
(1987).
2. Id

3. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, 611 F. Supp. 1542,
1544 (E.D. Va. 1985).
4. Id at 1544-45.
5. 33 U.S.C. § 1318(a)(3)(A) (1982).
6. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 379.
7. Id.
8. Id.

9. In its entirety, § 505(a) of the Clean Water Act, as codified, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a),
provides:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf (1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any other
governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by the eleventh
amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an
effluent standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an order issued by
the Administrator or a State with respect to such a standard or limitation, or
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the
Administrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not discretionary with the Administrator.
The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount
in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce such an effluent standard or limitation, or such an order, or to order the Administrator to perform
such act or duty, as the case may be, and to apply any appropriate civil penalties under section 1319 (d) of this title.
Congress in 1987 amended the section, but the amendments are not relevant to the discussion of this case. For the current statute, see 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365(a) (West Supp. 1988).
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filed suit in the Eastern District of Virginia as private attorneys general
in June, 1984, after Gwaltney's last violation, seeking civil penalties.'"
Gwaltney contended before the district court that the court lacked
jurisdiction under section 505.1 Gwaltney argued that since the section
only allows citizens to file suits against polluters alleged "to be in violation" of the Act, past violations are not actionable because past violators are not "in violation."' 2
The district judge, in a memorandum opinion, decided the semantic
puzzle in favor of the Foundation. He equated a polluter that exceeded
the discharge limitations in its NPDES permit, but had since complied,
with a past tax evader who paid taxes the following year. 3 The Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, 14 holding
that the language of the statute was ambiguous but that citizen suit
enforcement should be comparable to government enforcement and that
the citizen suit statute was intended to include past permit violators."
The Supreme Court held that jurisdiction for citizen suits against
wholly past violators under the Clean Water Act does not attach unless
the plaintiff makes a good faith allegation of continuing violations.'" The
Court remanded the case to the Fourth Circuit to decide whether the Foundation had alleged in good faith that Gwaltney would or might continue
violating its permit conditions. 7 But the majority reached further in its
opinion to state that section 505 is prospective in orientation 8 and that
cases would become moot if, during the course of the litigation, a defendant could show that there was no continuing likelihood of violation.
By holding that citizen suits against past violators can achieve jurisdiction when good faith allegations of continuing violations are proffered,
the Supreme Court appeared to choose a "middle-of-the-road" approach."°
It seemed to allow future suits to be brought against violators whose violations occurred in the past, so long as plaintiffs alleged that they had
sufficient reason to believe that the conditions causing the violations would
10. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 380.
11. Gwaltney, 611 F. Supp. at 1544.
12. Id. at 1547.
13. Id Also, Judge Merhige found Gwaltney to be liable for a maximum penalty of
$6,600,000 but adjusted the civil penalty downward to $1,285,322. Id at 1565. The citizen
suit provision does not provide a private right of action, and any fines levied are payable
to the government and not to the plaintiff. Sierra Club v. SCM Corp., 580 F. Supp. 862, 863
(W.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 747 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1984). The provision does, however, provide for
attorney fees when appropriate. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1982).
14. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, 791 F.2d 304,317 (4th
Cir. 1986).
15. Id at 309.
16. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 386. Justice Marshall's opinion prevailed in the case by
a 5-3 margin.
17. Id.
18. Id at 382.
19. Id at 386.
20. Respondents' Supplemental Brief on Petitioner's Writ of Certiorari at 2, Gwaltney
of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 108 S.Ct. 376 (1987) (No. 86-473) [hereinafter Respondents' Supplemental Brief].
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continue. However, the Court's further holding that cases could be dismissed as moot if defendants comply during the litigation has already hindered attorneys representing environmental concerns 2' and may ultimately
strip the citizen suit provision of its deterrent value.
BACKGROUND

The citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act places enforcement
powers in the hands of citizens to supplement the powers of federal or
state enforcement agencies. 22 The provision requires the citizen or citizens
group suing to provide sixty days notice to the administrator of the EPA,
the state concerned and the company alleged to be in violation of emissions limits. 2 3 Citizens are not allowed to prosecute actions against violators when the EPA or the state is actively pursuing enforcement. 24 The
section also allows citizens to sue the administrator "where there is alleged
a failure of the Administrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not discretionary with the Administrator." 2 Citizen-plaintiffs
2
can seek injunctive relief and civil penalties under the provision. 6
Before the Supreme Court's decision in Gwaltney, there was a threeway split of authority between the Fourth, Fifth and First Circuits. The
Fourth Circuit's decision in Gwaltney2' recognized jurisdiction in cases
against all past violators of the Clean Water Act. 26 The Fifth Circuit's
decision in Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical Co. 29 precluded jurisdiction in a case involving a single past oil leak in the Texas Panhandle. 0
In Pawtuxet Cove Marina,Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp." the First Circuit held
that a citizen suit against a past violator may go forward if the plaintiff
likelihood that the defendant will proin good faith alleges a continuing
32
ceed to violate the Act.
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Gwaltney represents the position that
allowed jurisdiction in cases by citizens against permit holders for wholly
past violations. 3 3 The Fourth Circuit judges discussed the limitations
placed on citizen suits - the sixty day notice provision and the prohibi21. See, e.g., Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 682 F. Supp.
1186, 1191 (N.D. Ala. 1988) (holding that a stay should be granted to allow defendants to
comply with their permit so the case could be rendered moot).
22. Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. 1, 14
(1981). The Middlesex Court held that Congress preempted federal common law nuisance
actions by passing pollution control legislation with defined remedies. Id at 22.
23. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A) (1982).
24. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (1982).
25. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2) (1982).
26. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1982).
27. 791 F.2d at 317.
28. Id.
29. 756 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1985).
30. Id at 398-99.
31. 807 F.2d 1089 (1st Cir. 1986).
32. Id at 1094.
33. See, e.g., Connecticut Fund for the Environment v. The Job Plating Co., 623 F. Supp.
207, 213 (D. Conn. 1985); Student Public Interest Research Group v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.,
615 F. Supp. 1419, 1425 (D.N.J. 1985).
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tion on suits already being pursued by authorities - and concluded that
those were the only limitations intended by Congress,3 4 The court saw "no
reason to impose35by implication limits which Congress could have, but
did not, create.
Hamker and others,3 6 however, concluded otherwise by applying the
plain meaning doctrine in interpreting the statute.37 In Hamker, the plaintiff sued under the citizen suit provision against a non-permit holder whose
oil had leaked from a pipeline into the plaintiff's creek. 3 The district court
dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 9
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court, concluding that
the plaintiff's insistence "that 'to be in violation...' [actually meant] 'to
have violated' obviously strains the grammar of the statute and diverges
from its ordinary meaning."40 The Fifth Circuit also stated that the citizen
suit provision was meant "to be exercised only where neither the authorities nor the polluter acts to terminate the ongoing violation." 4' The court
noted that the sixty day notice provision and prohibition against filing
suits against companies already being sued by authorities supported its
position. 2 Further, the court stated that the Supreme Court's assertion
that Congress had drastically limited citizens suits to avoid placing an
43
undue burden on federal courts also supported its decision."
Judge Williams specially concurred in Hamker, stating that the decision should not be construed to prevent suits against the "chronic episodic violator or the violator who intentionally 'turns off the spigot' just
before a citizen brings suit.""5
Pawtuxet Cove Marina stemmed from alleged violations prior to
November 1983 by the Ciba-Geigy Corporation on the Pawtuxet River
in Rhode Island.46 The defendant had completed a tie-in with a municipal
treatment facility and had ceased operating under its permit, however,
before the plaintiff sued the company.'7 The federal district judge in Rhode
Island dismissed the plaintiff marina's claim for lack of subject matter
48

jurisdiction.

34. Gwaltney, 791 F.2d at 310.
35. Id
36. See, e.g., City of Evansville, Ind. v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, 604 F.2d 1008,
1014 (7th Cir. 1979); Sierra Club v. Copolymer Rubber & Chemical Corp., 621 F. Supp. 1013,
1015 (M.D. La. 1985).
37. 756 F.2d at 395.
38. Id at 394.
39. Id
40. Id at 395.
41. Id at 396.
42. Id
43. Middlesex, 453 U.S. at 15. See infra note 22.
44. Hamker, 756 F.2d at 396.
45. Id at 399 (Williams, J., concurring).
46. 807 F.2d at 1090.
47. Id at 1094.
48. Id at 1091.
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In Pawtuxet Cove Marina,the First Circuit criticized Congress' draft-

ing of the citizen suit statute but concluded that, "the proper interpretation of the statute lies somewhere between an absolute, literal, application
of its language and the unlimited meaning adopted by the Fourth Circuit."'' 9 The First Circuit then held that jurisdiction attached "if the citizenplaintiff fairly alleges a continuing likelihood that the defendant, if not
enjoined, will again proceed to violate the Act." 0 Nevertheless, the court
affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the marina's claim."
The First Circuit explained that the good faith allegation was to be
used as a threshold for the purpose of reaching subject matter jurisdiction, much as the $10,000 amount in controversy is required to reach diversity jurisdiction." The court explained that, just as diversity jurisdiction
is not lost if a lesser sum is proved to be involved, a plaintiff who in good
faith alleges continuing violations may recover a penalty judgment for
past violations 3even if violations ceased at some point preceding or during the action.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Gwaltney to resolve this split
of authority, with lower courts following both the Fourth and Fifth Circuit decisions, and likely to split further by following the First Circuit.1
PRINCIPAL CASE

Gwaltney contended before the Supreme Court that the Fourth Circuit's decision should be overruled because it allowed plaintiffs to pursue
their claims, although Gwaltney had ceased polluting a month before the
case was filed.55 Gwaltney argued that the district and Fourth Circuit decisions in Gwaltney violated the principle of Hamker,which applied the plain
meaning doctrine and construed the "in violation" language of Section
505 of the Clean Water Act to mean that for citizens to bring suit under
the act the company would have to be guilty of ongoing NPDES permit
violations.5 6 Gwaltney also argued that legislative history supported its
position and that jurisdiction could not attach on the basis of "mere allegations."57
The Foundation countered by arguing that the ambiguity of the statute rendered the "plain meaning doctrine" inappropriate and that "[it
would ill serve the framers of the law to ignore their intent because we
were constrained to pretend they were always punctilious grammarians.
49. 1& at 1092.
50. Id at 1094.
51. Id.
52. I& at 1093.
53. Id at 1093-94.
54. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 381.
55. Brief for Petitioner at 9, Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation,
Inc., 108 S. Ct. 376 (1987) (No. 86-473).
56. Id. at 10-11.
57. Id at 26-43.
58. Brief for Respondents at 8, Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 376 (1987) (No. 86-473).
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The Foundation also argued that statutory context and legislative history showed that citizen suits were meant to punish past violators as well
as to stop present ones. 9
The United States, purporting to support the Foundation,60 actually
argued a position closer to that of the First Circuit,6' which allowed jurisdiction against past violators only when good faith allegations of continuing violations were made.Y Many other parties submitted amicus briefs
supporting both sides.63
In his opinion for the Supreme Court, Justice Marshall agreed with
the Foundation that the "to be in violation" language of the citizen suit
provision of the Clean Water Act "is not a provision in which Congress'
limpid prose puts an end to all dispute. 6 4 However, he continued, "[tihe
most natural reading of 'to be in violation' is a requirement that citizenplaintiffs allege a state of6 5either continuous or intermittent violations"
for jurisdiction to attach.
Marshall concluded that the "pervasive use of the present tense"
throughout the citizen suit provision supported his position that the statute is prospective in nature and that wholly past violations are not sufficient grounds for jurisdiction.6 The Act defines " 'citizen' as 'a person
...having an interest which is or may be adversely affected' "by permit
violations. 7 Such passages led Marshall to conclude that "the harm sought
to be addressed by the citizen suit lies in the present or the future, not
in the past."6 Also, the sixty day notice provision of the Act, Marshall
reasoned, was meant to give violators an opportunity to cease NPDES
permit limitations and "render unnecessary a citizen suit."6 "
59. Id at 11-18.
60. Brief for the United States as Arnicus Curiae at 1. Gwaltney of Smithfield v.
Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 376 (1987) (No. 86-473(.
61. Id at 9.
62. Id
63. Briefs supporting Gwaltney were also submitted by the Connecticut Business and
Industry Association; the Mid-Atlantic Legal Foundation and Consumer Alert; Rollins
Environmental Services (NJ) Inc.; The Chamber of Commerce of the United States, American Petroleum Institute, Chemical Manufacturers Association and American Paper Institute; Consolidated Rail Corporation, Crucible Materials Corporation, Ferro Corporation, Jersey
Central Power & Light Company, McDermott, Inc., Murphy Oil USA, Inc., Pennsylvania
Electric Company, Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., Shell Oil Company and Universal Tool
and Stamping Co., Inc.; and Bethlehem Steel Corporation, Acme Steel Company, ARMCO,
Inc., Inland Steep Company, LTV Steel Company, Inc., USX Corporation, and American
Iron and Steel Institute.
Supporting the Foundation were the states of Alabama, California, Connecticut, Hawaii,
Maine, Michigan, Missouri, New Mexico, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia and
Washington; the National Wildlife Federation; along with Friends of the Earth, Sierra Club,
National Audubon Society, Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Massachusetts
Public Interest Research Group, Atlantic States Legal Foundation and Connecticut Fund
for the Environment.
64. Gwaltney, 108 S.Ct. at 381.
65. Id
66. Id at 382.
67. Id
68. Id
69. Id at 382-83.
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The majority also rejected the argument that the provision for civil
penalties in Section 505 meant that the statute was retrospective to some
extent. The opinion stated that the civil penalties' inclusion in the same
sentence as injunctive relief meant civil penalties could be sought "only
in a suit brought to enjoin or otherwise abate an ongoing violation."' 0 Marshall also noted that the frequent description of citizen suits as abatethe view that the statute
ment actions by members of Congress supported
7
was not meant to address past violations. 1
Marshall then agreed with Pawtuxet Cove Marinaby holding that Section 505 confers jurisdiction over citizen suits when the plaintiffs make
a good faith allegation of continuing violations.7 2 Further, he rejected
Gwaltney's contention that plaintiffs must prove their allegations of continuing noncompliance to achieve jurisdiction.73 He cited with approval
the amicus curiae brief of the United States, which stated that the statutory language "reflects a conscious sensitivity to the practical difficulties of detecting and proving chronic episodic violations ....74
But after emphasizing that plaintiffs need not prove ongoing violations for jurisdiction to attach, the majority opinion took a curious turn.
Marshall stated that if allegations of ongoing noncompliance "become false
at some later point in the litigation because the defendant begins to comply," the defendant could seek to have the case dismissed as moot." He
asserted, however, that under the mootness standard defendants had the
that violations "could not reasonably be
burden of clearly showing
76
expected to recur.
The Court remanded the case to the Fourth Circuit to determine
whether the Foundation had made a good faith allegation of continuing
violations. 7 Justice Scalia concurred with the Court's holding that Section 505 of the Clean Water Act was prospective in nature. 78 Scalia dissented, however, with the Court's holding that a good faith allegation of
70. Id.at 382.
71. See, e.g., Water Pollution Control Legislation,HearingsBefore the Subcommittee
on Air and Water Pollutionof the Senate Committee on Public Works, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 1, p. 114 (1971), discussed in Gwaltney, 108 S.Ct. at 383.
Marshall also rejected respondents' contention that remarks by Senator Muskie that
the suits would be allowed "in the case of any person who is alleged to be, or to have been,
in violation, whether the violation be a continuous one, or an occasional or sporadic one"
meant that the statute should apply in cases against past violators. Gwaltney, 108 S.Ct.
at 384. (quoting CONG. REC. 33,700 (1972)).

72. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 385.
73. Id
74. Id
75. Id at 386 (Noting that "[1]ongstanding principles of mootness, however, prevent
the maintenance of suit when 'there is no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be
repeated.' ").

The court held in an earlier antitrust case that "mere voluntary cessation" of allegedly
illegal conduct does not moot a case, but that the case could become moot upon a showing
that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur. United States
v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Assn., 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968).
76. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 386.
77. Id
78. Id
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continuing violation is sufficient for jurisdiction to attach.79 He contended
that citizen-plaintiffs must be able to prove their allegations of continuing violations to show subject matter jurisdiction."
ANALYSIS

Had the Gwaltney Court simply held that citizen-plaintiffs could
achieve jurisdiction by alleging in good faith that there is a likelihood of
continuing violations, the decision would have recognized jurisdiction in
cases against permit violators who comply during the litigation. The First
Circuit applied the good faith allegation standard in its decision on Pawtuxet Cove Marina.8' The good faith allegation standard, by itself, would
not prevent most well-intentioned citizen suits from achieving jurisdiction. It would, however, prevent citizen-plaintiffs from poring over discharge monitoring reports to find long past violations over which to sue
with the expectation of collecting attorney fees. In other words, the standard would prevent suits that serve no potential abatement purposes.
Thus, the good faith allegation standard, by itself, is of little solace
to potential defendants. The good faith allegation standard does not emasculate the citizen suit provision as Gwaltney and a host of amici hoped
it would.82
However, Marshall's opinion in Gwaltney diverged from Pawtuxet
Cove Marinaby stating that Section 505 of the Clean Water Act is "prospective in orientation" 83 and that cases under that section may become4
moot if the defendant ceases to violate its NPDES permit limitations.
The First Circuit regarded the good faith allegation of ongoing violations
as a test for subject matter jurisdiction, analogous to the $10,000 needed
for diversity jurisdiction, and held that plaintiffs would not lose jurisdiction if the defendant subsequently complied with its permit.85
Marshall's argument that the provision for civil penalties in Section
505 does not mean the statute was retrospective to some extent was weak.
He stated that the inclusion of civil penalties in the same sentence as
injunctive relief shows that abatement was the purpose of the statute.
However, a careful reading of Section 505, excluding excess wordage,
shows that Congress authorized courts to enjoin future violations and to
79. Id. at 387-88.
80. Id.
81. 807 F.2d at 1094. It was the Foundation, in fact, that brought Pawtuxet Cove Marina
to the Supreme Court's attention. Respondents' Supplemental Brief, supra note 20, at 2.
82. For example, Rollins Environmental Services argued that the citizen suit provision violated separation of powers under the Constitution. Brief of Amicus Curiae Rollins
Environmental Services (NJ) Inc. at 7. Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 376 (1987) (No. 86-473).
83. 108 S. Ct. at 382.
84. Id at 386.
85. Pawtuxet Cove Marina, 807 F.2d at 1093-94.
86. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 382.
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charge civil penalties but did not condition one upon the other.8 7 The provision allowing civil penalties supports the First Circuit's view that the
section was meant to address both prospective and retrospective remedies. For instance, civil penalties cannot punish violations that have not
yet occurred.
The First Circuit had found a reasonable middle ground that allowed
citizen suits to proceed through to conclusion even if assertions of continuing violations should prove false. In contrast, Marshall's dubious conclusion that the Act was exclusively prospective in orientation may have
seriously damaged the citizen suit's deterrence against pollution.
Although Marshall stated that defendants' burden in showing mootness in mid-litigation is "a heavy one" - requiring defendants to show
that there is no reasonable expectation that they will violate their NPDES
permit limits again 8 - the majority's holding still takes away much of
the deterrence built into the provision. A company has little to fear from
citizen suits if it violates its permit limitations now, because it can begin
installing treatment equipment as soon as a citizen gives notice to sue.
A company can, as Judge Williams noted, "turn off the spigot, '89or it
can just wait until notice is given before it begins installing pollution control equipment. Under Gwaltney, a company can have a case dismissed
as moot at any point during the litigation. Even if a company is violating
its permit on the day the suit is filed it can escape liability later when
its pollution control system is completed.
For example, an Alabama federal judge recently stayed a citizen suit
so that the defendant could finish upgrading a treatment facility so that
the case would be rendered moot.8 0 The Alabama court may have effectively halted the action against the defendant, although the defendant
had continued violating its NPDE S permit through the day on which the
suit was filed. 91 Further, the Alabama decision was not overtly inconsistent with the majority opinion in Gwaltney. The Alabama judge construed
Gwaltney as barring suits against wholly past violators, 92 which is only
true if the defendant can shoulder the burden of showing there is no continuing likelihood of violations. The judge reasoned, however, that since
the case would likely be rendered moot upon completion of Tyson's
be stayed until the effectiveness
wastewater facility, the action should
93
of the facility could be evaluated.
Other post-Gwaltney decisions also illustrate how inconsistently the
majority's opinion has been construed by courts. Even the judges of the
87. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) 11982). After deleting excess wordage, the sentence reads thus:
"The district courts shall have jurisdiction ...to apply any appropriate civil penalties under
section 13191d) of this title."
88. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 386.
89. Hamker, 756 F.2d at 399.
90. Tyson Foods, 682 F. Supp. at 1191.
91. Id. at 1190-91.
92. Id. at 1189.
93. Id. at 1190.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1989

9

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 24 [1989], Iss. 1, Art. 5
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXIV

Fourth Circuit, for instance, lacked any magical insight when they considered Gwaltney on remand.14 The Fourth Circuit judges remanded the case
back to the district court with instructions to determine whether the Foundation had proven either 1) that violations continued on or after the date
of the complaint was filed; or 2) that a reasonable trier of fact could have
determined there was a continuing likelihood of intermittent or sporadic
violations. 5
By requiring the Foundation to prove its allegation against Gwaltney, the Fourth Circuit echoed the dissent of Justice Scalia, which would
have placed the burden on plaintiffs of showing continuing violations, and
was inconsistent with the majority opinion. 6 To be consistent with the
majority decision, the court should have placed the burden on Gwaltney
to show that it wouldn't violate its permit again. The district court found
against the defendants again, on the basis of expert testimony that showed
9
there was some likelihood of continuing violations during winter months. 7
However, the Fourth Circuit's misreading of Marshall's opinion is typical of a pattern of confusion among the lower courts already taking shape.98
From the standpoint of protecting clean water, a better decision would
have been one more closely aligned with the First Circuit's PawtuxetCove
Marinadecision, which made the good faith allegation of continuing violation simply a jurisdictional test.99 Such a decision would have allowed
suits to continue through completion if a defendant's pollution system is
completed during the course of the litigation, and it would reduce the likelihood of polluters waiting to be sued before installing treatment facilities.
Such a decision would also have eliminated the confusion caused by Gwaltney as to whether plaintiffs must prove their allegations of continuing
harm or whether defendants must prove the allegations wrong. Under
Paw tuxet Cove Marina, there is no burden of proof regarding continuing
violations, if fairly alleged, since the good faith allegation is just a jurisdictional test.9 0 Under the First Circuit rule, once jurisdiction attaches there
is no mootness question placing the burden on defendants, and plaintiffs
are not required to prove continuing allegations to proceed with the case.
Further, the majority's decision would have been truer to Congressional intent had the Court followed Pawtuxet Cove Marina. Under the
language of the statute, citizens may sue polluters who are "alleged to
94. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, 844 F.2d 170, 170-72
(4th Cir. 1988).
95. Id at 171-72.
96. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 386-88.
97. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, 688 F. Supp. 1078,
1079 (E.D. Va. 1988).
98. For cases construing good faith allegations of continuing violations as a jurisdictional test, see, e.g., Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Carter-Wallace,
Inc., 684 F. Supp. 115, 122-23 (D.N.J. 1988); Brewer v. Ravan, 680 F. Supp. 1176, 1182-83
(M.D. Tenn. 1988); Sierra Club v. Simkins Industries, Inc., 847 F.2d 1109, 1114 (4th Cir.
1988); Hudson River Fishermen's Ass'n v. Westchester County, 686 F. Supp. 1044, 1051
(S.D.N.Y. 1988).
99. 807 F.2d at 1093-94.
100. Id

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol24/iss1/5

10

Wicox, Jr.: Environmental Law - Will Jurisdiction Attach in Citizen Suits aga
1989

CASENOTE

be in violation" of their NPDES permits.'"' That could mean that, as the
First Circuit decided, the good faith allegation should be construed as a
jurisdictional test. The Supreme Court's decision that citizen suits are
meant solely for abatement purposes is plainly wrong, since inclusion of
civil penalties among citizen suit remedies1 2 means that the provision is
retrospective as well as prospective. The First Circuit's decision can be
reconciled with the provision's retrospective remedy, since it would allow
courts to extract civil penalties in cases in which defendants come into
compliance long after, at the time of, or shortly before the case is filed. 10
Marshall's opinion cannot be reconciled with the language of the statute,
because it does not recognize the inherently retrospective nature of the
civil penalty provision.'0 '
CONCLUSION

The Gwaltney majority's holding that citizen suits against past violators can be maintained when good faith allegations of continuing violations are proffered could have been a positive step in clarifying the "in
violation" language of the citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act.
The allegation requirement alone would have halted suits without abatement purposes while allowing good faith actions to go forward. But, in
an effort to further clarify the section, the majority reached too far by
stating that Section 505 was prospective in nature and that the cases could
be dismissed as moot if polluters came into compliance. Ultimately, the
decision, in its effort to reach clarity, will further cloud the controversy,
and it could severely limit the deterrence of the citizen suit. The decision
has sufficiently damaged the effectiveness of the citizen suit that Congress may need to amend the Act to clarify its intent.
WILLIAM

101.
102.
103.
104.

A.

WILCOX, JR.

33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1982).
Id.
Pawtuxet Cove Marina, 807 F.2d at 1093-94.
33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1982).
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